Karl Popper introduced his situational logic/situational analysis as a methodological framework for exploration and explanation in social science. However, despite a positive reception, especially amongst economists, Popper’s somewhat terse formulation of his model, together with the nuances in different versions of the original idea, have created an impression of internal inconsistency and conflict with other parts of his otherwise unified system of thought. In this paper, following a brief, though critical, review of Popper’s methodological approach to social science, the author shall tries to introduce a more consistent “reading” of the methodology of situational logic/ situational analysis. It will be argued that in making sense of events, processes and texts, situational logic/situational analysis lays emphasis on notions such as “situations”, “institutions/structures”, “social constructs”, “intention”, “action”, “rationality”, “meaning”, and “context”. The upshot of the arguments of the paper is that while “situational logic/situational analysis” cannot be claimed to be the only suitable approach for its intended realms of application, it offers the benefit of a number of explanatory frameworks including covering and causal Law, idiographic and hermeneutic models, with the extra bonus that, contrary to other models, its findings are objective and therefore publicly criticizable