

Global Space: Powerfulness and Powerlessness of Cultures

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Abstract

This paper will examine powerfulness and powerlessness of cultures in relation to the process of globalization. It will present a model in the frame of glocal space which explains responses of indigenous cultures, integrated of local and global forces. Studying culture in glocal space provokes a serious challenge for cultural studies in the field of anthropology, which traditionally relies on a spatially localized society. Here, cultures are assumed to be powerful and that is when people and societies feel proud of their culture, civilization and flag. Contrary to this, cultures are also inferred as to be powerless when people feel apologetic about their culture and civilization and therefore generally when people wish to become members of other societies and citizens of other countries.

Keywords

Citizenship, fabric culture, glocal space, globalization, globalize, glocalization, localism, netizenship, power of culture, social belonging, virtual citizenship

Introduction

Many sociologists, anthropologists and academics in the field of cultural and media studies emphasize that cultural change is an inevitable aspect of cultural continuity. In the words of Rochon (1998), there are times in the life of any human community when change is the only course of action that will actually permit continuity. At times one has to be radical, to be conservative.

Abraham Lincoln said that a house divided against itself cannot stand. Karl Marx wrote of the class contradictions that would

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bring down capitalism. Betty Friedan referred to “the problem with no name” that made life unbearable for the American housewife...Edmund Burke (the conservative’s conservative) and Mikhail Gorbachev (the reforming Communist) agrees that if you try to preserve everything, you end by saving nothing (Rochon 1998:3).

From this perspective, one can define globalization as a decisive turning point, an irresistible force precipitating radical cultural change.

It is now widely recognized that various processes of globalization have enormously destabilized the power of many indigenous cultures. In the global age, citizens are exposed to a far greater range of influences, pressures, anxieties and threats emanating from transnational forces than was formerly the case (Delanty 2000). It is indeed globalization that is the decisive factor here; it hastens and deepens the major forces for diversification, cross-fertilization and articulation of transnational cultures, all of which have in turn expanded the context for individualism: it is henceforth individual choice rather than indigenous norms that determines orientation towards religion, culture and society. Thus the interplay between an individual and the global is becoming as important as, if not more important than, the one between an individual and his local environment. This is the transformed context of power and culture, local and global citizenship, the concern of this paper.

Before going into the principal argument, it is important to make the following observations about the international context. There appears to be a new tension at work between western and eastern cultures: ‘Westernization and Easternization’. This dichotomy in the global framework should be seen as two simultaneous ‘projective processes’; the two forces are of course not equal, but there is a discernible projective aspect in both forces, for the East is currently projecting itself in a way that reflects, inversely, the historical experience of the West’s self-projection. What one is seeing, therefore, is a binary struggle, which has been termed by Barber as ‘the struggle between Jihad and McWorld’ (Barber 1996). While this characterization expresses one aspect of the confrontation, there is much more to it than the dimensions suggested by the two terms McDonalds and Jihad. There is also much more to the confrontation than what is suggested in Huntington’s term ‘Clash of Civilizations’. Since, even if violence and contestation for power are indisputably the existent factors, there is not merely a question of clash. There are, in the words of Huntington’s recent book, ‘many globalizations’ (Berger and Huntington 2002) which implies that the interactions between East and West cannot be reduced to the dimension of violence or conflict alone; there are areas of overlapping interest, mutual influence, reciprocal exchanges on the level of culture, philosophy, art,

spirituality that abstain simplistic and analytically redundant efforts from reducing these projections and assimilations to one single level.

Westernization has been and continues to be a 'projective process' that entails the centralization of a western capitalist culture (Went 2000) and the marginalization of many indigenous cultures; this is an ideological process which has caused the 'powerfulness of western culture' and 'powerlessness of non-western cultures'. This is because in some sections of the society, in both relative and absolute terms, religious affiliation, nationalism and citizenship have been considerably debilitated. At the same time the very 'space' of globalization has potentially created an ideological process which can be termed 'Easternization'; forces such as Islamic fundamentalism, Buddhist ethics, and Eastern spirituality in general, can be seen as the multifarious aspects of this new phenomenon of Easternization. Based on such a global inter-cultural communication, this paper will examine cultural competence (Nybell and Gray 2004) within 'global culture' (Robertson 1995) to articulate on different layers of cultural belonging; to find out how one culture can turn out to be powerful or powerless.

Conceptual Definitions

Three interrelated themes, 'glocal space', 'the power of culture' and 'the power of citizenship', form the main conceptual focus of this study. To understand how culture can be evaluated as weak or powerful one needs to examine culture in the context of a new 'space' which is a combination of local as well as global flows of information, values, norms and practices. Culture in relation to nation state cannot be understood unless one examines the core content of citizenship, in particular the 'emotional aspect of citizenship'. As is clear, these three structural concepts can be schematically represented in a binary formation of two different models, which can help to illustrate the powerfulness and powerlessness of cultures.

Global Space

First we need to appreciate that globalization has changed the concept of space in the arena of culture, politics and economics. Therefore in the contemporary disciplines of sociology, geography and international relations, the theme of space has become a key concept for any critical discussion (Delanty 2000). Today the theme of many sociologists is the dislocation of place and space (Robertson, 1992, Waters, 1995, Featherstone, 1995 and Castells 1996). In the globalization era, space is located in 'deterritorialized' channels of communication: Delanty (2000:129) states that 'space is no longer

dominated by the space of the state; other deterritorialized spaces have emerged along with the break-up of national society as the privileged codifier of social space.'

'Glocal' space refers to the concept coined by Roland Robertson. He suggests (1995:28) that 'glocalization' describes more accurately the simultaneously enlarging and telescoping influence of the global and the local forces. This new concept was introduced by Robertson for two reasons. First, the analysis of the processes of globalization has hitherto neglected local influence to a large degree and has been constructed on largely trans/super-local bases (Ameli 2002:24). Therefore, the glocal factor takes into consideration both local factors and global factors. The inter-relatedness of world society mediated by the global communication industry synthesises the local and global sphere into one space. This did not only result in a one-way flow—the domination of trans-national values, cultures and civilization over indigenous cultures—but also creates a flow in the opposite direction, it is thus relative, and not absolute. It is relative due to the fact that globalization can work in so many different ways: as a wake-up call, or a reflective mirror for cultures to see themselves, their history and their national identity more clearly than ever before; and as a force that weakens cultures and attitudes by showing their relativity. This process is thus a relatively introspective ground for crystallizing binary opposites, such as self-identity and other-identity; indigenous culture and alien culture; national values and trans-national values. The outcome of such oppositions is never easily predictable.

Power of Culture

It is important to explain what we mean by power, a term that has been used without sufficient definition. Poggi (2001:24) discussed four types of power; political, ideological/normative, economic and military power. He ignored, however, the power of culture. One can argue that power as a concept is fundamental to the analysis of both political affairs, and in different forms within the cultural arena. Bertrand Russell (1962) suggests that power is to culture what energy is to physics. But it is important to realize that 'neither power nor energy is an object of the sensate world; both are hypothetical constructs. One does not see or touch energy as such, but one may observe its manifestations in heat, light, motion, growth, and decay. Thus we say that energy has been expended when in fact what we see is a bird taking flight or a rock falling. So with power: it is a construction of the mind introduced because it is useful in describing and explaining important empirical phenomena. One cannot actually reach out and touch power but one observes its manifestations in every human relationship and social arrangement (Parenti 1978:3-4).' This is

why, the concept of power is so elusive and it has been defined in so many different ways. As Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) suggested 'the power of a man, to take it universally, is his present means, to obtain some future apparent good'. Bertrand Russell (1934:35) saw power 'as the production of intended effects'. These definitions, while containing some value, are not so relevant for our purposes. Hobbes and Russell define power more in terms of political resources, which is a sort of institutional definition and thus delimitation of power; our concern here, on the other hand, is with power in a more non-restrictive sense, such as it operates within the arena of culture. On the other hand, according to Werlin (2003) the difference between poor countries and rich countries has to do with governance power rather than economic resources. Werlin examines three general theories of governance (organizational, cultural, and structural-functional) presented in Ferrel Headys textbook in comparative administration.

There are different approaches to the power of culture (see Lears 1988, Kane 1991, Somers 1995a and 1995b, Bader 1997, Wigen 1999, Lake 2003, Pina 2003 and Roy 2004). Classical sociologists such as Weber (1968) show how the struggle for power shaped ideas and values, arguing that the interests of powerful groups had lasting influence on the shape of a culture. Contemporary theorists like Foucault (1980), on the other hand, see culture as itself a form of power. He argues that new kinds of knowledge and associated practices in effect construct new sites where power can be deployed. New disciplines, such as psycho-analysis, construct new loci such as the unconscious, new subjectivities, where power can be exercised (and also where resistance can emerge). Foucault (1977, 1983) eliminates the question of who has power, leaving aside the role of interested agents, to emphasize instead that each cultural formation, each technique of power, has a history of its own, and that different actors adopt these techniques for different purposes. Since cultural practices, categories, and rules are enactments of power, Foucault does not think of culture as being pursued by the powerful to maintain their power, rather, he thinks of power itself as embodied in the practices that deploy knowledge as well as constituting the ground upon which human beings operate as the subject of that knowledge.

One theorist whose work is relevant to our concern here is Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu (1984) shows how deeply inequalities between the more and less privileged penetrate persons, constituting the fundamental capacities for judgement, aesthetic response, social ease, or political confidence with which they act in the world. Actors use culture in creative ways to forward their own interests in a system of unequal power, but the effect of that struggle is to reproduce the basic structure of the system (Swidler 2002: 314).

According to our definition, culture is the main source of power. Power here means the total range of influences—global, local and glocal—impinging upon the individual. Power assumes the shade of these dimensions of culture in attitudes, social practice, and psychological orientation. Power also articulates the level of mass involvement within national culture; it is also of course intimately related to the political dimensions of national and transnational relations. However, despite the global aspects of power of culture, it is the immediate environment—the home culture—which is still predominant as basic cultural action regards. Thus, when one wishes to analyse the power of the national environment upon the individual, the relationship between culture, power and *citizenship* assumes central importance; this importance being in proportion to the degree to which culture is still regarded as the infrastructure of citizenship. Therefore, home culture can be considered ‘powerful’, when the members of a particular culture are content with it, and are proud to be identified with this culture of their homeland. When people feel a sense of satisfaction because of their attachment to their own home culture, we can take this to mean that such people, and their society as a whole, are strongly influenced by that culture; this, in turn, indicates that the home culture is actively alive and powerful. The same goes, needless to say, for those cultures from which people derive a sense of superiority.

Citizenship

Turner (1999:262) defines citizenship as ‘a collection of rights and obligations which give individuals a formal legal identity; these legal rights and obligations have been put together historically as sets of social institutions such as the jury system, parliaments and welfare states.’ Faulks (2000:13) initiated the importance of power of citizenship in implying equality, justice and autonomy in society. Turner attempted to present a rigorous sociological model of citizenship. In this model his main concerns are related to the institutions of citizenship, such as social identity, the nature of inequality and access to socio-economic resources and membership of the political community—the nation-state. From a sociological perspective, the institutions of citizenship protect individuals and groups from the negative outcomes and unintended vagaries of the market in a capitalist society.

One of the advantages of Turner’s model of citizenship, compared to the Marshal theory of citizenship, is that Turner considered the importance and significant role of the economy as very significant factor for the empowerment or rendering powerless the resources of citizenship. So that, for example, inflation is regarded as negative and has the largely unintended consequence of eroding citizenship, alongside corruption in public life which is a major

negative indicator of the condition of citizenship in modern society (Turner 199:265).

One can argue that while Turner rightly gave much attention to the political and economic resources of citizenship, he neglected the role of cultural resources in citizenship. Culture can play an important role in establishing the solidity, firmness and powerfulness of citizenship and vice versa. Aihwa Ong (1996:737) viewed cultural citizenship 'as a process of self-making and being-made in relation to nation-states and transnational process...such modalities of citizen-making are influenced by transnational capitalism.'

Evidently, citizenship is a multi-layered concept. One can distinguish three different components of citizenship:

1) Individual and social rights

Which pertain to the responsibilities of the state towards the citizens as much as the responsibility of citizens towards state and society. Rights are reciprocal, with obligations on both the individual and collective levels.

2) Emotional elements of citizenship

This is the hidden layer of citizenship which shows the level of belonging to a culture and state; this emotion acts as what Hoffman (1997) calls a 'momentum concept'. Indeed one of our major criticisms of much of the existing literature on citizenship such as the work of Marshal, Turner (1999), Delanty (2000) is that it fails to pay enough attention to this question of emotional attachment to the indigenous culture and the state. Citizenship contains an internal logic that is rooted in the love of the culture and state in which one finds oneself. This elucidates how it is that Faulks (2000) believes that citizenship is not domination, whether the source of that domination is the state, the family, the husband, the church, the ethnic group or any other force that seeks to deny the recognition of the self as an autonomous individual.

3) Need of recognition

Need of recognition is a very important element for strengthening the feeling of belonging to a nation, culture and state. This element of citizenship is especially important for immigrant communities, people who live in rural areas, peripheral ethnic groups who do not share the same language, ethnicity and ethos of the central state. Faulks (2000:4) suggested that 'the status of citizen implies a sense of inclusion into the wider community. It recognises the contribution a particular individual makes to that community, while at the same time granting him or her individual autonomy. Faulks called this as an 'ethic of

participation'. When the collectivity assumes large dimensions, such as in cosmopolitan societies or in the context of the digital development of the world community, the need for recognition is more apparent and demanded by society. Citizenship is an umbrella force, which creates a sense of belonging and membership in a society. It seems that globalization, the process of unification of time and space and the 'virtualization' of realities, creates an unrecognized position for the members of a previously bounded political geography, a nation-state and a welfare society. Therefore, recognition from political authority, as well as from the individuals in society, is in a state of complex fragmentation.

We would venture further and argue that citizenship comprises more than the interplay of rules, obligations and official rights: the core resides in the emotional element of citizenship. This is the love—and hate—of culture and state. This can be categorized into four types of citizenship, demonstrated in the following matrix; these four types of citizenship can be seen in two different models of powerful culture and powerless culture. The following categories will be examined in the following section:

1. Powerful Culture: Inclusive Citizenship
2. Powerful Culture: Relative Citizenship
3. Powerlessness of citizenship and nationalism
4. Powerlessness of citizenship and cultural alienation

Table: Four types of Citizenship

Love of Culture	Love of State
Hate of Culture	Hate of State

2. Empowerment of Cultures

Accordingly, citizenship is powerful, when people of a particular nation feel proudly happy to be considered as a member of that national or political community; when the flag of the country evokes a sense of stability,

permanence, continuity—and even salvation—for a person, this clearly demonstrates an influential and firm kind of citizenship. Citizenship is also strong when it generates a sense of loyalty which mobilizes members of a society to defend the country against its perceived enemies. Citizenship in a society is strong when the individual considers the motherland as an extension of his/her own home—a national village or a community of love. Generally speaking, powerful culture depends on strong citizenship. The more satisfactory citizenship, the more powerful culture will be resulted. Citizenship as base for nation-state has become powerless in political and cultural extends. This is due to the fact that the whole system of nation-state in particular within developing countries has been challenge by process of transnationalization of power, culture and society. Faulks (2000:133) sees globalization as a serious challenge to citizenship due to the fact that it blurs cultural boundaries. Citizenship without cultural boundaries and clear identity can be no more than a superficial concept, which is unlikely to engender the values of civic virtue necessary for good governance (Miller, 1995). This is in fact what relates a politics to a culture and vice versa (see Somers 1995b).

The essence of these new circumstances for Turner (2000:19) is both globalization of economic and cultural relationship and the postmodernization of cultural phenomena. For him these are the same issues, due to the fact that the postmodernization of culture is closely related to the development of hybridization, and hybridity is a function of cultural globalism. The main challenge is: how can one be a citizen in such a context of staggering diversity? How can citizens be committed to some political community (the state) when fragmentation makes the possibility of solidarity unlikely? How can citizens be committed to their own national political community, when globalization as a projective process displaces people from their mother land to the new type of 'digital citizenship' which does not exist in the 'real' world, and is not physically accessible?

Generally speaking, the response to this circumstance has been somewhat apologetic and typically nostalgic. The point of my paper is to celebrate the diversity and heterogeneity of the responses. Therefore citizenship needs a new typology according to the different layers of the society. It also appears important to give more emphasis to the main forces which are involved in the formation of new postmodern citizenship.

I want to refer to the three layers of citizenship that we discussed earlier, and see how we can implement these in the light of the dichotomy between the powerfulness and powerlessness of culture in the glocal space.

Powerful Culture and Social Justice

Generally speaking, people feel powerful when the level of scarcity and poverty become as low as possible. Globalization and the collapse of the walls between nations have made the differentials in standards of living around the world transparent. The better the situation in terms of standards such as social welfare, security, housing and food quality, the wider the attraction to, and desire and wish for membership and citizenship will become. The authority of culture here refers to the lawful aspect of citizenship which initiates the responsibility of state towards people and vice versa (see Marshall 1950; Turner 1999 and 2000).

Powerful Culture and Cultural Power of Citizenship

Culture is what people consume and live out in their everyday life. One can also regard culture as the means by which the tangible and intangible heritage of the past, relate a society to its indigenous religion, values, traditions, arts and social practices. It is clear for example that Islam as a transcultural religion has acquired different connotations and orientations depending upon which particular locality and culture it has been situated in and practiced within. The same thing can be said about art and social values. In the interconnection of local and global forces, it is glocality that sensitizes the following three different outcomes.

A. Globalize or Transnationalism

Westernization or Easternization: If one stresses global cultural values in terms of the dominant universal and privileged standard of life—then westernized cultural citizenship is the orientation for the easterner and this is, of course, a major and dominant tendency today. However its opposite, ‘easternization’ for the westerner, is far less prevalent, and restricted to those who feel impelled to make their choices more in terms of cultural and spiritual values than material standards of living. But such a choice still presupposes a certain level of material well-being: the ‘easternization’ in question is still a dimension of a privileged life-style for the westerner.

B. Localism or Indigenes

As the ground for extending the diversity of cultures and as a force for the transparency of ‘otherness’, globalization plays an important role for ‘identity reflection’; consequently ‘cultural indigenism’. In the mirror of pluralistic presentation of cultures, people observe their own culture in a more transparent

way than ever before. This is why, in contrast to those who believe that globalization challenges the power of nation state; many believe that the nation state alongside indigenous culture, national identity as well as religious identity, have all become stronger than ever before.

C. Glocalism

It seems there is no pure local and global phenomenon any more. Even localism or globalism is a type of reactionary resistance, which in turn is a kind of response to new cultural forces. Glocalism can be seen as postmodern culture also. Postmodern culture, according to Turner, (2000: 19) is 'an effect of and response to a social work which is increasingly complex and differentiated, and to a culture which is increasingly reflexive and skeptical about its own sources of authority'.

Cultural globalism is also a 'stress factor' leading to the detachment of members of a political community from culture and citizenship. On the other hand cultural glocalism can be considered as a serious challenge to the firmness, authority and publicity of a citizenship and cultural membership within a home culture. Cultural globalism is the social foundation for 'structural duality', hybridity, and 'cool' or limited citizenship. Localism and loyalty towards home culture, is the only basis for 'warm citizenship' in the society. When people feel content, happy and proud of their own civilization, culture and standard of life, then 'warm citizenship' is apparent.

Powerful Culture and Social Recognition

When the collectivity assumes large dimensions, such as in cosmopolitan societies or in the context of the digital development of the world community, the need for recognition is more apparent and demanded by society. Citizenship is an umbrella force, which creates a sense of belonging and membership in a society. It seems that globalization, the process of unification of time and space and the 'virtualization' of realities, creates an unrecognized position for the members of a previously bounded political geography, a nation-state and a welfare society. Therefore, recognition from political authority, as well as from the individuals in society, is in a state of complex fragmentation.

3. Powerlessness of Cultures: Loss of Belonging Orientation and Virtual Immigration

Sometimes power can exist, but without force (Jackman 1993). Sometimes culture exists as a dominating source but without empowering its subjects. When culture becomes too enlarged, it is be difficult to engage as a force for

national identity. In the globalization era, social and cultural orientation becomes very diversified and inclusive to such an extent that concentration on any *one* culture is very problematic.

Powerlessness of citizenship and nationalism

Citizenship and nationalism become completely powerless when one hates both the culture and the state. In this circumstance either a person looks for physical immigration or he/she makes a cultural/virtual immigration—a sort of ‘virtual’ immigration, which means living in a particular country, but feeling a sense of belonging to another nation, culture and society. That is why one can observe typical American culture outside the United States and vice versa.

Cultural Alienation and Powerlessness of citizenship

The feeling of weakness felt by a citizen is when one is alienated from his/her own indigenous culture but for some political reason loves the state. Due to that alienation from the culture, the citizen can easily give up and leave the country. If one hates his/her indigenous culture, every single step on the ground of that culture is misery and pain because culture is the ‘real context of everyday life’ that accordingly, the individuals of that culture communicate and live. This type of alienated citizenship does not make for strong membership of the ‘national community’ as a whole; it does not create ‘strong responsibility’ for the country as a whole either. In this circumstance, duality of orientation, and displacement of cultural orientation, creates a fertile ground for vagrancy, hybridity and cultural alienation.

Lack of trust, confidence and love for a home culture can be rooted in two different forces; internal forces and external forces. Internal forces that lead away from one’s own culture include such negative factors as violence, poverty, irrationality of views, and differing values and traditions, in contrast to the external perceived ‘high’ culture, which has been presented as an example of rationality, progress, freedom, peace and happiness. In such circumstances, attractions of the ideas of the foreign culture, and repulsion from one’s home culture will cause hopelessness, immigration or strong sense of nostalgia for the alien culture. External forces can also play significant role within the reaction against one’s home culture. According to Birch and his colleagues (2001:9) the West, in an unstated doctrine, introduces itself as ‘reasonable and rational, and more human because of its supposed long tradition of respect for democracy, justice and public accountability. This attitude translates into a position where organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund feel that they need to force Asian governments and nations to take their medicine,

which usually means giving up sovereignty over their own economic and social affairs and policies.’ This sort of approach and world view, potentially induce an analogy that:

The West is the parent, and Asia is the child, a position which provided the rationale for colonialist policies in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and which was used by the British, French and Dutch governments in opposing independence movements in countries such as India, Vietnam and Indonesia (ibid, pp 9-10).

Sometimes a culture is treated as an inferior culture, sometimes a religion, as a heritage of many nations and diverse civilizations, is shown as an embodiment of violence and negativity. Birch and his colleagues (2001: 5) suggested that, for example, being a western Christian implied being sympathetic, pious and sensitive, while being a Muslim meant that one was fanatical violent, irrational, harsh and cruel. In other words, possessing an ‘inferior culture’ or ‘inferior civilization’ is one of the rationales which justifies people being treated as less than human, as is evident in the world today (ibid, p. 5). Such a world view is a result of Euro-centrism and Americo-centrism. One of the consequences of this idea is the division of the world between Centre and Periphery, which articulates the idea that world society, has a centre; there is a central zone in the structure of world society. From this perspective ‘the centre zone, is a phenomenon of the realm of values and beliefs. It is the centre of the order of symbols, of values and beliefs, which govern the society. It is centre because it is the ultimate and irreducible; and it is felt to be such by many who cannot give explicit articulation to its irreducibility (Shils 2002:47).

Virtual Citizenship: ‘Netizenship’ or Displaced Citizenship

‘Netizens’ instead of citizens is a concept which foresees the mode of citizenship for future society. This type of citizenship can be defined as a sort of ‘*displaced citizenship*’. The concept of netizenship was discussed first within a framework of Singaporeans network development proposal. Pam Oh, official of the National Computer Board of Singapore stated that ‘our purpose is to prepare Singaporeans for a web life, so they become the *netizens* of tomorrow, superconnected, technologically savvy, civic-minded and knowledgeable’ (cited by J. Wilson and S. Willson 2001:64). Netizenship has the potential to forge new types of multiculturalism— such as digital multiculturalism.

Two types of multiculturalism can be distinguished: *Physical* and *Digital* multiculturalism. Physical multiculturalism can be defined as living peoples

with different cultural, national and ethnic background in one political community—a single space which is limited to the geopolitical boundaries of a nation-state. As Kymlicka stated (1995:1) stated ‘most countries today are culturally diverse. According to recent estimates, the world’s 184 independent states contain over 600 living language groups, and 5,000 ethnic groups. In very few countries can the citizens be said to share the same language, or belong to the same ethno-national group. This is a serious challenge; even for liberalism that how liberal theory can manage to respond to differences of culture and identity within political communities and to the many conflicting demands that emerge from them? (Carens 2000:52) When we come to digital multiculturalism the problem becomes very much more complicated. Digital multiculturalism, referred to as the virtual world—a single space in which all nations, cultures, languages, ethnic group live. This multiculturalism is not limited to a particular state, nor to a particular language or culture. It includes everyone around the world.

New multiculturalism accelerated by diversity, intensity and speed of changes. This is result of the structural challenges emerged by globalization; induced the speed of change and unculturalized changes, which caused the ‘fundamental lose of orientation’ (Virilio 2001:24). Cultural communities within nation states and also inside smaller arena such as the country culture are facing a bombardment of diverse values, ideas, imaginations, information, and fashions from the real and the global digital world. Such challenges, do not allow the peaceful fruition of cultures which in turn leads to stability and institutionalization.

This is the result of the instantaneous multi –faceted operations of trans-national cultures all over the world, and undoubtedly western cultural operations are the most prevalent and dominant in this sphere. In such a fragile context, any continuity and development including the evolution of full membership of a political community in the form of citizenship is unattainable for the less dominant recipients subject to these forces.

Conclusion

The forces that have been discussed throughout this paper explain how culture is either empowering or weakening, but either way it is a critical component which cannot be underestimated in its importance in the overall analysis of the factors which come to delineate glocal space . The importance of contemporary culture and how it permeates and modulates the qualities of citizenship have also been examined. ‘Global popular culture’ plays a significant role in the ‘development of choices’ for not only individuals with nation states but the very manner in which nation states themselves are able to

interact in the arena of world society. The power of choice is unsurprisingly essential in relation to the development of the new materialism which is the hallmark of the global popular culture —consumerism. The consumption of every thing and the search for new and diverse ways to exercise this choice has come to replace the particular cultural pursuit of any given society. The boundaries of the public sphere have stretched from the national to the global. The importance of the public sphere as playing an important role for political culture in general and citizenship in particular (Somers 1995a) must now be extended to the glocal public sphere.

Richard Worthington (2000:103) believes that in contrast to the general perception thus far held, which refers to the oneness of humanity and nature within the context of religious or scientific discourse, with the onset of globalization, this perception has become the working premise of material production. So that from this perspective globalization forces the expansion of the public sphere from the local to the global arena. The whole notion of such classic concepts such as ‘publicity’, and therefore popularization, has been transformed from the boundaries of a large mass in a specific geographical space to the unbounded ground of the entire globe. Popular culture nurtured in such a glocal sphere is thus the challenge for indigenous cultures.

Popular culture is a complex concept and its definitions are not obvious (Storey 1999:14), but as Williams (1963) suggests popular culture can at least be defined as something liked by many people; inferior kinds of work; work deliberately setting out to win the favour of the people and culture actually made by the people for themselves. According to Williams conceptualization of popular culture, Storey (1999:6) defined popular culture as that which is ‘widely favoured or well liked by many people’. This wide-spread popularity of transnational culture plays a vital auxiliary role for transposing a culture from the national resources to the trans-national one. The emergence of new information and communication technologies and the speed with which cultural changes can now take place signal the speed with which peripheral indigenous cultures around the globe are weakened. This process of rapid change in cultural values may also shift values commonly held in any society, resulting in the development of a new “common sense” that guides people’s thought and behaviour. Such cultural changes may overwhelm the political system like an irresistible tide, breaking up long-standing advocacy coalitions and forging new political alliances and policy networks (Rochon 1998:239). These structural changes within political systems manifest when loyalty towards the state is replaced by rejection of it and that which is cynically despised is the guiding ‘common sense’ of the society. When the home or indigenous culture reacts to transnational forces in an apologetic way the process is speeded up, resulting in poorer quality home culture and the consequent lack of trust in the state. This

binary process causes a fundamental loss of orientation, and depletes the self-confidence and cultural strength of nation states leading to necessarily inferior social and cultural transformations of those nation states and the inevitable spread of corruption. The forces of both powerful and powerless culture and the attendant transformative forces of popular global culture, alongside varying notions of citizenship combine to define the glocal sphere. An apologetic, corrupt and weakened nation state determined by the materialism of global popular culture deprives the individual of the fruits of mature citizenship and a truly meaningful indigenous cultural identity.

This paper can be concluded in very abstract concept that citizenship suffered locally from disorganized and corrupted political state and super political power together with global popular cultural play globally a significant role in demolishing sense of belonging to a home culture and being a citizen of a particular nation.

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